101.52.239.0/24 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS4816 China Telecom (Group) RPKI valid 31 701841344816 2026-09-18 2026-09-20
AS17622 China Unicom Guangdong Province Network RPKI valid 10 345495511483717622 2026-09-18 2026-09-20

RPKI

5 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
101.52.239.0/24 /24 AS4816 apnic authorises it
101.52.239.0/24 /24 AS17622 apnic wrong origin
101.52.239.0/24 /24 AS45079 apnic wrong origin
101.52.238.0/23 /23 AS17622 apnic wrong origin
101.52.238.0/23 /23 AS45079 apnic wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
101.52.0.0/16
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2010-12-16

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers Sample path First seen
101.52.238.0/23 v4 AS17622 China Unicom Guangdong Province Network RPKI valid 41 345495511483717622 2026-09-18

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-18 07:14:24Z origin change AS17622 → AS4816 573814270841344816