103.219.32.0/22 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS58461 China Telecom Hangzhou IDC Network RPKI valid 37 7018413458461 2026-09-18 2026-10-12
AS56041 China Mobile Group Zhejiang Company RPKI valid 5 38001747358453980856041 2026-09-18 2026-10-12

RPKI

4 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
103.219.32.0/22 /32 AS4837 apnic wrong origin
103.219.32.0/22 /32 AS56041 apnic wrong origin
103.219.32.0/22 /32 AS58461 apnic authorises it
103.219.32.0/21 /32 AS4837 apnic wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
103.219.32.0/22
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2016-05-16

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers Sample path First seen
103.219.32.0/21 v4 AS4837 China Unicom Backbone RPKI valid 42 3454955114837 2026-09-18

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-10-12 05:21:18Z origin change AS58461 → AS56041 3798956300132132465758453980856041
2026-10-09 08:59:13Z origin change AS56041 → AS58461 328840327727174413458461
2026-10-09 08:27:11Z origin change AS58461 → AS56041 57821125863257584535845358453980856041
2026-10-07 17:55:06Z origin change AS56041 → AS58461 49134533566939413458461
2026-10-07 16:58:43Z origin change AS58461 → AS56041 3798956300132132465758453980856041
2026-10-07 16:39:42Z origin change AS56041 → AS58461 149073356413458461
2026-10-07 14:37:47Z origin change AS58461 → AS56041 149071299584535845358453980856041