103.85.87.0/24 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS56046 China Mobile Jiangsu Province Network RPKI valid 2 557201747658807980856046 2026-09-18 2026-09-19
AS23650 China Telecom Jiangsu Province IDC Network RPKI valid 1 4439335710100999929413423650 2026-09-18 2026-09-19

RPKI

5 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
103.85.84.0/22 /24 AS4837 apnic wrong origin
103.85.84.0/22 /24 AS23650 apnic wrong origin
103.85.84.0/22 /24 AS56046 apnic authorises it
103.85.84.0/22 /24 AS131483 apnic wrong origin
103.85.84.0/22 /24 AS151300 apnic wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
103.85.84.0/22
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2017-02-07

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers Sample path First seen
103.85.86.0/23 v4 AS4837 China Unicom Backbone RPKI valid 5 55720100994837 2026-09-18

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.