106.13.254.0/23 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS58466 CHINANET Guangdong province network RPKI valid 41 7018413458466 2026-09-18 2026-10-21
AS136958 China Unicom Guangdong IDC Network RPKI valid 1 3798956300132132100994837136958 2026-10-08 2026-10-21

RPKI

4 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
106.13.252.0/22 /24 AS38365 apnic wrong origin
106.13.252.0/22 /24 AS56040 apnic wrong origin
106.13.252.0/22 /24 AS58466 apnic authorises it
106.13.252.0/22 /24 AS136958 apnic wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
106.12.0.0/15
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2011-03-22

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Nothing less specific is announced.

More specific routes

2 announced prefixes inside this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers First seen
106.13.254.0/24 v4 AS56040 China Mobile Group GuangDong Company RPKI valid 1 2026-09-18
106.13.255.0/24 v4 AS56040 China Mobile Group GuangDong Company RPKI valid 1 2026-09-18

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-10-14 03:34:34Z origin change AS136958 → AS58466 328840327727174413458466
2026-10-14 03:32:12Z origin change AS58466 → AS136958 3798956300132132100994837136958
2026-10-09 04:03:49Z origin change AS38365 → AS58466 557202914413458466
2026-10-09 03:30:32Z origin change AS58466 → AS38365 55720174765845398085604038365