180.188.16.0/22 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS136190 China Telecom Zhejiang Jinhua IDC Network RPKI valid 2 44393357101009999294134136190 2026-09-18 2026-10-08
AS56041 China Mobile Group Zhejiang Company RPKI valid 2 557201747658807980856041 2026-09-18 2026-10-08

RPKI

3 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
180.188.16.0/20 /32 AS4837 apnic wrong origin
180.188.16.0/20 /32 AS56041 apnic wrong origin
180.188.16.0/20 /32 AS136190 apnic authorises it

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
180.188.16.0/20
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2009-09-16

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers Sample path First seen
180.188.16.0/21 v4 AS136190 China Telecom Zhejiang Jinhua IDC Network RPKI valid 3 44393357101009999294134136190 2026-09-18

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-10-07 16:09:11Z origin change AS56041 → AS136190 37989563001321321009948374134136190
2026-09-27 21:10:31Z origin change AS136190 → AS56041 20409220766291693528089661580258453980856041