202.108.130.0/24 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network RPKI valid 42 701848374808 2026-09-18 2026-10-19
AS4847 China Telecom Beijing Province Network RPKI invalid 1 443933571048094847 2026-09-18 2026-10-19

RPKI

3 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
202.108.130.0/24 /24 AS4808 apnic authorises it
202.108.128.0/18 /18 AS4808 apnic too specific
202.108.128.0/17 /17 AS4808 apnic too specific

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
202.108.0.0/16
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
1998-08-17

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers Sample path First seen
202.108.128.0/18 v4 AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network RPKI valid 43 701848374808 2026-09-18
202.108.128.0/17 v4 AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network RPKI valid 43 701848374808 2026-09-18

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-10-12 01:51:37Z origin change AS4808 → AS4847 443933571048094847