2405:1480:2000::/48 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS23724 China Telecom Beijing IDC Network RPKI valid 24 7018413423724 2026-09-18 2026-09-20
AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network RPKI valid 10 38001747348374808 2026-09-18 2026-09-20

RPKI

3 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
2405:1480:2000::/48 /48 AS4808 apnic wrong origin
2405:1480:2000::/48 /48 AS23724 apnic authorises it
2405:1480:2000::/48 /48 AS59025 apnic wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
2405:1480::/32
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2016-05-09

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Nothing less specific is announced.

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-20 04:44:47Z origin change AS4808 → AS23724 348002963290024134413423724
2026-09-19 08:28:12Z origin change AS23724 → AS4808 29504393923389148374808
2026-09-18 07:26:06Z origin change AS4808 → AS23724 14035776939413423724
2026-09-18 07:21:23Z origin change AS23724 → AS4808 1403577693948374808
2026-09-18 06:41:22Z origin change AS4808 → AS23724 49432215510483621299413423724
2026-09-18 06:29:34Z origin change AS23724 → AS4808 349275665548374808