2a04:5205::/32 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS209641 IHOR HOSTING LTD RPKI valid 36 506283559835196209641 2026-09-18 2026-09-21
AS50113 FIRST SERVER LIMITED RPKI valid 2 2448250113 2026-09-18 2026-09-21

RPKI

2 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
2a04:5205::/32 /32 AS50113 ripe wrong origin
2a04:5205::/32 /32 AS209641 ripe authorises it

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
2a04:5200::/29
RIR
RIPENCC
Country
🇻🇬 VG
Status
allocated
Allocated
2013-07-23

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Nothing less specific is announced.

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-21 06:05:54Z origin change AS50113 → AS209641 85269393559835196209641
2026-09-21 06:05:54Z origin change AS209641 → AS50113 34927566555011350113
2026-09-21 06:05:31Z origin change AS50113 → AS209641 3885569393559835196209641
2026-09-21 06:04:45Z origin change AS209641 → AS50113 5666220473355985011350113