2a09:ec00::/29 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS39392 SH.cz s.r.o. RPKI valid 20 3772139392 2026-09-18 2026-09-18
AS29134 Webglobe, s.r.o. RPKI valid 15 2448229134 2026-09-18 2026-09-18

RPKI

2 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
2a09:ec00::/29 /29 AS29134 ripe wrong origin
2a09:ec00::/29 /29 AS39392 ripe authorises it

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
2a09:ec00::/29
RIR
RIPENCC
Country
🇨🇿 CZ
Status
allocated
Allocated
2018-11-06

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Nothing less specific is announced.

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-18 07:11:02Z origin change AS29134 → AS39392 57381427083389139392
2026-09-18 06:41:36Z origin change AS39392 → AS29134 4943248362176429134
2026-09-18 06:41:27Z origin change AS29134 → AS39392 4943221551048362129939392
2026-09-18 05:35:59Z origin change AS39392 → AS29134 4943248362176429134