2a10:f9c0::/29 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS44841 Egressif LLC RPKI valid 35 244822654844841 2026-09-18 2026-09-20
AS202365 Chronos RPKI valid 1 202365 2026-09-18 2026-09-20

RPKI

2 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
2a10:f9c0::/29 /48 AS44841 ripe authorises it
2a10:f9c0::/29 /48 AS202365 ripe wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
2a10:f9c0::/29
RIR
RIPENCC
Country
🇹🇷 TR
Status
allocated
Allocated
2021-06-24

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Nothing less specific is announced.

More specific routes

2 announced prefixes inside this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers First seen
2a10:f9c0::/48 v6 AS202365 Chronos RPKI valid 37 2026-09-18
2a10:f9c0:5::/48 v6 AS44841 Egressif LLC RPKI valid 34 2026-09-18

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-18 04:44:48Z origin change AS202365 → AS44841 69396079265482654844841