43.240.72.0/23 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS56041 China Mobile Group Zhejiang Company RPKI valid 2 557201747658807980856041 2026-09-18 2026-10-03
AS134771 China Telecom Wenzhou IDC Network RPKI valid 1 44393357101009999294134134771 2026-09-18 2026-10-03

RPKI

3 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
43.240.72.0/23 /23 AS56041 apnic authorises it
43.240.72.0/23 /23 AS134771 apnic wrong origin
43.240.72.0/22 /22 AS4837 apnic wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
43.240.72.0/22
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2014-08-13

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers Sample path First seen
43.240.72.0/22 v4 AS4837 China Unicom Backbone RPKI valid 7 55720100994837 2026-09-18

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-27 21:10:31Z origin change AS134771 → AS56041 20409220766291693528089661580258453980856041