64.90.28.0/24 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS61112 AKILE LTD RPKI valid 28 3800134911743361112 2026-09-18 2026-09-19
AS979 NetLab Global RPKI valid 2 24482138997979 2026-09-18 2026-09-19

RPKI

2 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
64.90.28.0/23 /24 AS61112 ripe authorises it
64.90.0.0/19 /24 AS979 ripe wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
64.90.0.0/19
RIR
RIPENCC
Country
🇭🇰 HK
Status
allocated
Allocated
2000-05-12

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Prefix Origin RPKI Peers Sample path First seen
64.90.28.0/23 v4 AS61112 AKILE LTD RPKI valid 30 244821743361112 2026-09-18
64.90.16.0/20 v4 AS979 NetLab Global RPKI valid 40 345492914979 2026-09-18

More specific routes

0 announced prefixes inside this one

Nothing more specific is announced.

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-19 15:56:38Z origin change AS979 → AS61112 1403577645334911743361112
2026-09-19 15:56:03Z origin change AS61112 → AS979 204092207662916935280138997979
2026-09-19 15:55:43Z origin change AS979 → AS61112 49673315003216127334911743361112
2026-09-19 15:55:41Z origin change AS61112 → AS979 176399304138997138997138997979