83.111.0.0/17 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS8966 Etisalat (E&) RPKI valid 23 22652325784528966 2026-09-18 2026-09-22
AS5384 EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSC RPKI valid 20 3772189665384 2026-09-18 2026-09-22

RPKI

4 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
83.111.0.0/17 /17 AS5384 ripe wrong origin
83.111.0.0/17 /17 AS8966 ripe authorises it
83.111.0.0/16 /16 AS5384 ripe wrong origin
83.110.0.0/15 /15 AS5384 ripe wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
83.110.0.0/15
RIR
RIPENCC
Country
🇦🇪 AE
Status
allocated
Allocated
2004-01-20

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

More specific routes

8 announced prefixes inside this one

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-22 11:37:29Z origin change AS5384 → AS8966 852325784528966
2026-09-22 11:30:13Z origin change AS8966 → AS5384 55720693989665384
2026-09-22 06:20:27Z origin change AS5384 → AS8966 328840327727174676284528966
2026-09-22 06:20:04Z origin change AS8966 → AS5384 3772189665384
2026-09-22 00:05:31Z origin change AS5384 → AS8966 328840327727174676284528966
2026-09-21 11:12:23Z origin change AS8966 → AS5384 5030089665384
2026-09-19 08:43:22Z origin change AS5384 → AS8966 328840327727174676284528966
2026-09-19 08:30:30Z origin change AS8966 → AS5384 2950415935900289665384
2026-09-18 08:39:56Z origin change AS5384 → AS8966 226521299676284528966
2026-09-18 07:14:22Z origin change AS8966 → AS5384 573815030489665384