101.36.128.0/17 RPKI valid MOAS

Announced by 2 different origins, which is either a deliberate multi-origin setup or a hijack.

This prefix is announced by more than one AS. Compare how many collector peers see each origin below: a hijack is usually visible as a second origin seen by far fewer peers than the legitimate one.

Origins

Origin ASRPKI Peers seeing itSample path First seenLast seen
AS23724 China Telecom Beijing IDC Network RPKI valid 28 37721174413423724 2026-09-18 2026-09-20
AS133119 China Unicom IP network RPKI valid 13 70184837133119 2026-09-18 2026-09-20

RPKI

2 ROAs cover this prefix

ROA prefixMax lengthAuthorised originTrust anchorResult for this route
101.36.128.0/17 /17 AS23724 apnic authorises it
101.36.128.0/17 /17 AS133119 apnic wrong origin

Registry

Who this address space is delegated to, regardless of whether it is routed

Delegated block
101.36.128.0/17
RIR
APNIC
Country
🇨🇳 CN
Status
allocated
Allocated
2010-12-14

Less specific routes

Announced prefixes that contain this one

Nothing less specific is announced.

More specific routes

12 announced prefixes inside this one

Recorded changes

WhenChangeOriginPath
2026-09-18 07:14:21Z origin change AS133119 → AS23724 5738142708413423724
2026-09-18 05:28:20Z origin change AS23724 → AS133119 49673204854837133119
2026-09-18 05:28:09Z origin change AS133119 → AS23724 4967320485413423724